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THE AVAILABILITY OF EVIDENCE IN
SUPPORT OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF
George N. Schlesinger

One of the arguments to be discussed in this paper is designed to show that
from a religious point of view a great variety of theistic proofs are to be regarded
as objectionable. On the assumption that elementary fairness demands that all
of us ought to be equal in the eyes of God and in particular that access to the
one thing that really matters to the theist, the salvation reached through a God-centered life, must not vary from person to person, and on the traditional theistic
view which postulates absolute Divine fairness, it would seem that the believer
more even than the non-believer, should regard it imperative to find fault with
most theistic proofs. In the course of our discussion it will become clear that
even if this objection were valid certain kinds of proofs are immune to it. The
first few sections of this paper are devoted to the description of such a proof
which also happens to be pivoted on the assumption of Divine fairness.
I shall also attempt to say something about the important general problem as
to why most of the traditional theistic proofs, which at best point to the existence
of some kind of a supernatural being with no more than one or two well-defined
attributes, could have been taken to establish the existence of a full-fledged being
endowed with all the specific attributes of the Judeo-Christian Deity.
Many people look upon agnosticism as the most rational position to be recommended to all dispassionate and enlightened people nowadays. The numerous
attempted proofs throughout history and the equally numerous rebuttals are taken
generally to show that theism is intrinsically an undecidable thesis and no facts
are to be found anywhere through which its tntth or falsity could conclusively
be established. The evidence available lends itself to different interpretations;
objective reality offers inherently ambiguous testimony concerning the question
of its ultimate origin.
In the opinion of a wide group of thinkers, God's existence is a unique kind
of fact in the sense that if it obtains no phenomena within our range carries its
imprint and therefore the statement affirming it is essentially undecidable through
any observation. Nor can its credibility be established through rational argument.
Consequently, no feature of the accessible universe warrants anything but the
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withholding of judgment concerning theism and atheism and the occupying a
neutral, middle ground. The first half of this paper is devoted to the fairly detailed
description of an argument showing why this widespread view is untenable.
We shall begin by considering a person s who may be regarded as a highly
rational agent. He is to be assumed to have heard most of the proofs that have
been offered for the existence of God, some of which he found more interesting
than others, but none of which appeared to him irresistible enough to compel
him to admit that theism has high enough probability for it to be mandatory
upon a rational person to accept. At the same time he is not aware of the existence
of any decisive enough argument against theism which would render anything
but actual subscription to atheism irrational. To put this in symbols, what we
are saying is that s is an agnostic, who does not find any of the theistic proofs
adequate and therefore:
(a) - Bsg [

=

s does not believe that God (who has the attributes
ascribed to him traditionally) exists.]

At the same time he does not feel entitled to go far enough as to positively
declare that God does not exist, that is,
(13)

~

Bs- g

Another important characteristic of s is that he is completely dispassionate
and open minded and is ready to change his beliefs to accord with what seems
most reasonable to hold in the light of a new and convincing argument he may
learn of at any time. He is also reasonable enough not to tolerate inconsistent
beliefs. In fact if he were to discover that there was an implicit inconsistency
among the beliefs he holds or is committed to by implication, he will abandon
some of them so as to make the set he subscribes to, consistent. Since he
endeavours to be as reasonable as possible, he will not act arbitrarily but will
relinquish those beliefs that objectively appear to be least justifiable.
Let us now suppose that s, in the course of his efforts to understand the nature
of theism, learns that according to all the major versions of theism in the different
periods of history, it is a central part of the Divine plan to have created human
beings so that they may respond to him. Theists of different denominations
believe that we have been placed upon this earth in order to dedicate ourselves
to the realization of His will by observing all religious precepts. Religious acts
are the means that bring us close to the source of all perfections and enable us
to achieve our own perfection. Those who fail to live a Divine centered life,
e.g. by denying altogether His existence, are bound to remain incomplete, truncated creatures and will utimately suffer accordingly.
Thinking over these data leads s to the discovery, a discovery that has been
made by many before, that theism seems to harbor a contradiction, namely, that
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a being who is perfectly fair, determines unfairly His creatures' fate. The Scriptures declare 'All His ways are justice' and even in Natural Theology alone, His
perfection implies that He is absolutely just. Now people with a natural sense
of justice might be willing to concede that it is not unjust that persons who
believe in God and His commandments, yet neglect their religious duties, should
as a result be subject to suffering. But what about an honest agnostic, who has
dispassionately examined all the evidence available to him and concluded that
there is no sufficient rational basis for theistic belief? Surely it should be contrary
to Divine Justice to punish such a person; how is it even thinkable that He would
punish someone who did not sin willfully? Being an assiduous searcher of the
truth, as we said he was, he seeks at the earliest possible moment to consult
knowledgeable theologian T on this matter, to find out how he proposes to
resolve this problem. The theologian T offers him the following, by no means
startlingly novel, explanation:
The world is charged with the grandeur of God and anyone with a minimal
amount of good will cannot, after having acquired some knowledge of the nature
of the universe and having reflected upon the elementary characteristics of a
Divine Being, hold consistently with rationality and reasonableness that anything
but a full belief in the existence of God is warranted.
Consequently those who are mature enough to have become aware to some
extent of the splendor of nature and the nobility of faith and yet refuse to embrace
theism, must be people who find religious discipline unendurable and will therefore do everything to render their conscious mind oblivious to the basis of such
discipline. Thus they are going to engage in a willful suppression of the theistic
belief that has been implanted in their hearts and distort their natural thought
processes so as not to see what they are reluctant to see, and regard well supported
what they are anxious to have well supported. Obviously these people do not
merely erase religious faith from their awareness but uproot all the traces from
their minds that they have done any such erasure. These people will, of course,
suffer the consequences of their disbelief, but in view of the manner in which
they have promoted their state of mind, it is not to be viewed as any injustice
being perpetrated upon them.
Some theologians view the attitude of this class of people in less drastic terms.
They would not suggest that the members of this class have necessarily uprooted
a belief that was already entrenched in their minds. But as William James has
explained in his famous The Will To Believe, the convictions we acquire in the
first place are to a considerable degree shaped by our own desires. We are
selective in attending to evidence, avoid certain influences and subject ourselves
to others. It is possible for a person who is loath to submit to Divine authority
to direct subtly his own investigations in such a manner that he is more likely
to come across evidence hostile to theism than he would otherwise, and manage
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to overlook most of what may be construed as supporting religious faith.
Also, more liberal theologians will not describe the subsequent loss members
of this category are to endure, as vengeance wrought upon them or as constituting
well deserved Divine retribution, but rather as an inevitable outcome of their
own act. The salvation in store for the righteous is by its very nature something
that cannot be partaken of by those who have deliberately alienated themselves
from the Divine and who have freely chosen a way of life that leads them away
from where religious fulfillment is to be found.
Be that as it fllay, any theist should find it difficult to deny that the faithless
are bound to suffer some kind of loss. After all it is the core of all religious
thought that a God-centered life is the sublimest kind of existence. Hence those
who fail to embrace it inevitably deprive themselves of the greatest means for
self-enhancement.
The theist is bound to rule out the existence of people who with all the good
will at their disposal are incapable of seeing the truth of religion. If there were
such people then of necessity they would either have to endure the loss of
something precious or they would not have to. The latter is ruled out, as we
have said, because there is bound to be some kind of self-enrichment which can
be achieved exclusively by religious worship only. But if the former were true,
we would have an intolerable violation of Divine Justice. Ergo, there are no
such people.
This defense of Divine Justice has been held in varying forms by traditional
theologians of all generations. It is quite clearly stated for instance in Romans
I, 18-20 where Paul says of the non-believers that" ... they are stifling the truth.
For all that may be known of God by men lies plain before their eyes" and warns
that since there is no room for a plea of ignorance" ... there is no possible defense
for their conduct." The Abingdon Bible commentary explains that according to
Paul one needs no revelation in order to become fully aware of God's existence,
for Paul believes in natural religion and maintains that the only explanation for
those who refuse to submit to Divine authority is that "Men ... have been willfully
blinded to the evidence of God. They have suppressed living truth with impunity."
We shall assume that s is capable of understanding this fairly simple theological
explanation and in view of our previous description of the kind of person he is,
he is bound to find it very reasonable. Let me hasten to point out that what he
will find 'reasonable' at this moment is not the proposition that God exists. At
any rate he is not going to find it more reasonable now than he found it before
he discovered what seemed to him an inconsistency in Theism. His Agnosticism
may therefore be said to remain at precisely the same degree as it was before
that discovery. What he will find very reasonable is that if God exists then the
explanation given by the Theist corresponds to the truth. The explanation seems
completely successful in preserving Divine Justice. The only people who will
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persevere in their disbelief are people whom it makes good sense to regard as
sinners and deserving Divine retribution. Nor should it appear absurd nowadays
after Freud that people hold beliefs they find too repugnant consciously to
acknowledge and which they succeed in completely repressing.
Thus, according to T it is inherent in the very meaning of g by virtue of its
reference to an absolutely perfect being who among other things must be assumed
to be completely fair, that this being is not one to condone anyone suffering loss
through no fault of his own. T is not unaware that some people have been singled
out to endure poverty, disease and pain during their earthly passage but that does
not present for him the same kind of problem. These bodily afflictions, (as well
as such spiritual ones as the failure to be anointed to the High Priesthood or
entrusted with a prophetic mission), he believes, amount to no more than temporary setbacks. In the final count T is convinced that everything will balance out
perfectly. One who believes in an afterlife is in a position to postulate that
whatever inconveniences an individual may have to put up with here and now,
he will be duly compensated for in the world to come. T may well insist that
no permanent loss is involved by whatever one is deprived of during one's brief
sojourn in this shadowy place in which we are destined to spend the first stage
of our existence. But on the other hand, when we are talking about losing what
is ultimately in store for the righteous that is, about being deprived of a proper
afterlife itself, then of course we are talking about a final, irrevocable loss.
In order to avoid the possibility of this kind of real loss by anyone inculpable
T is forced to postulate that the just being he worships can be relied upon to
make His existence known to all well-disposed people. Our friend s hearing this
is bound to realize that (-y) (g & Ws) --. Bsg
must be true. In other words, T's explanation directly implies that in case g is
true as well as Ws, that is, s is well-disposed, then it inevitably follows that s
believes that g.
It will be seen at once, however, that (n) in conjuction with ('Y) implies by
Modus Tollens that - (g & Ws) or that - g v - Ws. In other words one must
conclude either that g is false or that Ws is false. In the first case the Deity as
conceived by T (who is absolutely perfect thus absolutely fair) does not exists
and (13) is to be withdrawn. In the second case hard as it may be for s to swallow,
he must abandon (n) realizing that the reason he could find no evidence for
theism is that he forced himself to overlook everything that pointed toward its
truth.
II

We began our discussion by stating that s, like many enlightened people
nowadays, thought our universe warrants no other position but agnosticism since
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objective reality offers no clear evidence indicating the existence of a supernatural
being. Now, however, T is in the position to prove to s that his attitude is
untenable. He can show that there is no basis for claiming that theism is inherently
undecidable by rational means based on objective features of the world. T may
well insist that our surroundings are replete with facts through which the status
of religious belief may conclusively be established.
Now it goes without saying that (-y) cannot be the subject of any dispute. Its
truth is guaranteed by definiton; T interprets g in such a manner that it entails
that God ensures that all well-disposed people believe in him. Assuming absolute
fairness Ws -+ Bsg, and thus s realizes that since in fact - Bsg, either - Ws
or else - g is true.
The crucial point is that whichever disjunct turns out to be true it is decidedly
not the case that reality is neutral concerning the status of theism. For in case
Ws is false there must be plenty of evidence all around us pointing conclusively
to the truth of g but s is not the well-disposed person he thought he was, thus
failing to see what was in front of his eyes. He is intelligent and open-minded
enough to understand that it is characteristic of all those who suppress any
favorable clue from their consciousness that they genuinely lack all memory
traces of such clues or of the act of its erasure. Such mental episodes are not
detectable in principle. An avowedly loving husband can be made by a skillful
psychiatrist to be confronted with indirect evidence to convince him that he
harbors very well suppressed hostile sentiments towards his wife.
The alternative is to say that W s is true in which case the reason why s could
find nothing decisive in favor of g is because indeed no such evidence exists
anywhere. In the present context, however, this fact must not be construed as
the neutrality of the universe with respect to the truth of religion. T is committed
to the view that if contrary to his existing conviction, the universe did not contain
conclusive evidence in support of g that itself amounted to decisive evidence
that g was false. It is his conviction that Divine justice is incompatible with the
creation of a universe that did not contain sufficiently convincing evidence
available to all testifying to His existence. It follows from the theological explanation leading to (-y) that a universe devoid of easily accessible observational
data affirming God's existence is a universe which bears positive testimony in
support of atheism. Thus s is left with the problem to ponder as to what the
objective nature of reality is: does it in fact speak clearly and loudly of a Divine
creator except that he has shut his ears so as not to hear the distinct message,
or does it decisively confirm atheism by its glaring omission to offer clear
evidence for theism?
It is to be noted that we do not admit a third possibility, namely, (- g &
- Ws). It would be irrational to declare Ws false, given that s holds entirely
honestly the firm conviction that he is well-disposed. It is only when no other
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alternative is left that it is reasonable to assert that ~ Ws. Now if g is true, then,
as has been argued, it follows that conclusive evidence in support of g must be
readily available. Hence s has no option but to concede that his failure to see
this can in no other way be accounted for but reluctantly postulating ~ Ws.
However, if ~ g, then there is no good reason for saying that, contrary to
significant prima facie evidence, that is contrary to s's very strongly held belief,
he is not well-disposed.
III

It is not possible to take our next step before we have clarified to some extent
an important consideration that should enter into one's deliberations as to which
one of the many religious hypotheses to adopt.
Let g' = a supernatural, but not fully perfect, being exists, while 'g' stands
for traditional Theism postulating the existence of an absolutely perfect being.
I should like to begin first by citing briefly a few reasons why if everything else
was equal, then upon being confronted with the choice between g and g' the
first should appear preferable.
Various traditional arguments for the existence of God, notably the Argument
from Design, the Cosmological Argument and Pascal's Wager, succeed at most
in showing that there is some being behind the physical universe, without showing
that he has the attributes ascribed to him by the Judeo-Christian tradition. The
Argument from Design, for instance, tries to impose upon us the belief in a very
powerful (but not necessarily omnipotent) and intelligent (but not necessarily
omniscient) being, but seems to carry no implications concerning such questions
as to whether he is merciful, forgiving or just. The fact that nevertheless these
proofs have played such a large role in theological discussions shows that it was
always assumed that if they yield any result at all they are bound to yield a belief
in a Divine being with the characteristics of traditional theism. Thus a survey
of the history of Theistic proofs show that at least as a matter of fact 'g' has
always been regarded as superior to 'g" and that is why the proof of the existence
of a mere supernatural being as such, if it were to succeed, would be regarded
adequate.
Another point worth remarking upon concerning g and g' is the attitude of the
various opponents of theism and attempted theistic proofs. There have been
many objections, for instance, against the Argument from Design. One objection
has been based on the claim that there is no justification for postulating a designer
when from an objective point of view the universe cannot be said to display any
design, apart from the design we subjectively ascribe to it. Another objection
has been that the argument gratuitously assumes that the universe in its entirety
which of course is a unique system, may be compared to the various physical
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systems contained in the universe many of which are known to be the results of
intelligent design and may be ascertained to be such through certain characteristics
they display. Virtually all the objections to the argument question one or another
of the assumptions of the theist. Surely a more effective way of attacking the
argument would have been to grant the theist all the presuppositions he deems
reasonable and point out that even then his conclusion does not follow. Thus
the most powerful attack would have been not to question whether there is actual
design displayed by the universe itself or any of the other assumptions, but to
point out that even if all the premises needed are conceded to be reasonable,
nothing follows to help us to decide between g and g'. Interestingly enough this
happens not to be the most commonly adopted line of attack, which seems to
show that many simply take it for granted that g is preferable to g'. In other
words, in general the atheist is prepared to concede that should all other alternatives be proven incredible and the sole question that remains to be decided
whether we are to adopt g or g', then we are to adopt g.
Someone who is of the opinion that the methodology applicable when faced
with the need to choose a religious hypothesis is essentially similar to the
methodology employed by scientists, might offer a plausible explanation to
account for the attitude just described. In science, generally the situation is such
that no matter how large our body of observational data, if we can find some
hypothesis accounting for all the data, we shall also be able to find an indefinitely
large set of alternative hypotheses, capable of accounting just as well for the
same data. To escape indecision we adopt the principle of simplicity and we
adopt the simplest of all such hypotheses. There exists a vast literature concerning
this basic issue, many aspects of which are yet to be settled. There is no agreement
among philosophers, for instance, whether it is correct to assume that the simplest
of all hypotheses that are identically related to all the observations is actually of
higher probability or that our preference is based on some other consideration.
Nor is there agreement on the question of the correct application of the notion
of simplicity. However, very few people would wish to deny the overall validity
as well as the universal importance of the principle.
In the case of hypotheses postulating the existence of a deity it might be argued
that the less it takes to offer a complete statement of a particular hypothesis the
simpler that hypothesis is to be regarded. g' of course refers to an infinitely large
number of hypotheses, some very encumbered, but even the least encumbered
cannot be as briefly stated as g. The remarkable idea that 'absolutely perfect' is
a unique predicate since it implies all the other predicates traditionally regarded
as constitutive of the definition of God-one of the most strikingly simple and
also great ideas produced in the whole history of western civilization-is of
course due to St. Anselm. Thus, the brief statement g offers a complete description
of the Deity it postulates. On the basis of g alone it is possible to determine for
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any property P, whether the being in question does or does not possess it. If
having P adds to the excellence of its possessor then an absolutely perfect being
has P, otherwise He does not have it. On the other hand, even the simplest
member of g*, for example one which postulates an absolutely perfect being
except that He is not absolutely just, would not be a complete statement without
some further description specifying the precise sense in which he may be unjust.
It might seem for a moment that this argument fails since one is forced to
admit that it is by nQ means obvious with respect to every property whether it
adds to or detracts from the excellence of its possessor. It is usually assumed
for instance, that omniscience is an admirable quality. Some might, however,
argue that a being whose knowledge is forever incomplete and who is constantly
seeking to increase it and thus never ceases from inquring and learning, is to be
more admired than one who needs no studying at all and is hence of higher
excellence and perfection than the former, and so on. A follower of St. Anselm,
however, could reply to a given property P whether it is an advantage or a
liability to possess it, but not that in fact it is not fully determined what the true
nature of P is. He might even go further and contend that it is even knowable
in principle whether P is of positive of negative value. He might claim that a
careful, thorough analysis would reveal that in the light of the various value
judgments to which a person is already committed, it is required for the sake of
coherence that he should ascribe a positive or negative value to P. Irrespective
of whether one finds this contention plausible or not, it will have to be conceded
that it is not easy to think of how one might go about refuting the contention.
On the Anselmian view then it would have to be agreed that g could be
reasonably regarded as the simplest of all the hypotheses postulating a supernatural
being who created and keeps looking after our universe. Sound methodology
may be claimed to demand that if everything else was equal, g is to be preferred
to all its rivals.
A somewhat more profound argument would begin by posing the question:
what are the factors that are relevant in determining the degree to which it is
rational for a person to commit himself to the existence of a given deity? It
seems that the rationality of one's commitment is the function of two variables;
first of all the higher the probability of the statement asserting the deity's existence, the more rational it should be to commit oneself to that deity's existence.
Secondly, the reasonableness of one's commitment should also increase with
the greater excellence and hence worshippability of the deity in question. The
situation is comparable to the one obtained in ordinary betting events. The degree
of rationality of betting on a given outcome depends not only on its probability
but also on the price associated with that outcome. The gambler's objective is
monetary gain; consequently the amount of prospective gain as well as the degree
of likelihood of a favored outcome playa role in determining the reasonableness
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of a certain bet. Indeed the degree of attraction of a given bet is measured by
the expectations associated with it, which is the product of the probability of
success and the reward it carries. Therefore in the special case where several
outcomes are equiprobable, the outcome carrying the highest reward is to be
rationally preferred.
In a parallel fashion an individual seeking a deity to worship aims at gaining
some great religious benefit. Consequently the answer to the question of which
deity should attract more one's commitment is determined by the likelihood of
that deity's existence as well as by His capacity of granting greater religious
value to the worshipper. The magnitude of that value is a function of the worshippability he possesses. g clearly postulates a being with maximum worshippability.
In the present context too, in the special case where different hypotheses are
supported by identical evidence the outcome carrying the greatest satisfaction is
rationally to be preferred. Thus reason dictates that g is to be preferred to any
of its rivals.
It should be emphasized that the foregoing argument does not pre-suppose a
mercenary attitude on the part of the religious seeker toward the choices confronting him. After all the value to be gained in the present context is of a
sublime nature and only a highminded person would endeavor to pursue it. The
benefit our agent is supposed to be after is nothing but the deeper satisfaction
that comes from the knowledge that the object of his worship highly deserves
to be worshipped.
We may thus enunciate a straightforward principle that should govern all
rational agents in quest of religious faith, that is parallel to the principle governing
rational behaviour in common betting situations. In the latter case, as we know,
we have:
Expectations associated with h
h turns out to be true.

=

Probability that h x Reward in case

The appropriate parallel expression is:
(W): Degree of justified inclination to worship D = Probability that D
exists x Degree of Worshippability of D
The particular collorary of Principle (W) that is of special interest for our purposes
involves the situation in which reason requires us to assign equal probabilities
to the existence of, say, D\ and Dz, as when the relevant evidence is precisely
the same in both cases. It is clear that in such a situation, regardless of whether
the probabilities are small or large, as long as they do not equal zero or one,
since the value is determined solely by the second factor, a person's attitude
will be shaped entirely by the relative degrees of worshippability ofD 1 and D 2 .
Now we come to the point of this section, which is T's argument that s is
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obliged to abandon the middle position he has taken up and move toward
embracing theism. Let g,' = An almost perfect being exists who (in particular)
lacks complete justice.
Suppose s is agnostic with respect to g' as well and hence the counterparts of
(a) and ([3) are also true i.e.
(a')

~

Bsg' and ([3')

~

Bs

~

g'

Does it inevitably follow that he has to accept also
("0 (g' & Ws) ---. Bsg'?

Clearly the answer is no. We recall that we are forced to accept (,y) because it
was incompatible with perfect justice that His existence should not be evident
to well-disposed individuals. But g' refers to a being who is not absolutely just
and thus ('Y') need not be postulated in order to render g' consistent.
Now it seems reasonable to claim that before being apprised of T's account
concerning the availability to evidence in support of religious belief s was able
to hold the following views concerning what theism actually amounts to:
(a) It requires a person to hold on to his faith even without being able
to resolve the difficulty concerning Divine fairness and in spite of it.
(b) Theism is in fact correctly expressed by one of the propositions
belonging to g' in which case no puzzlement arises in the first place.
In case (a): the fact that the problem of fairness continues to be hanging over
religious belief affects to some extent its credibility of theism. Given however
Principle (W) and that the evidence relevant to g is identical to that which is
relevant to g' and thus they are confirmed precisely to the same degree, it is
reasonable to have higher inclination to accept g than g'.
It is plausible to suggest that if s, like many other people unfamiliar with T's
thesis, has regarded himself earlier to be occupying a position equidistant from
the two extremities involving religious belief, then T's explanation should cause
him to shift somewhat in the direction of theism, regardless of whether his
previous position was (a) or (b). After all, had (a) been the case then the first
of the factors of the right-hand side of (W), the credibility of theism, would
have been lower than what it has become now, and if (b) had been true then the
second factor, the degree of worshippability of the Divine being postulated,
would have been less than it is now.

IV
The foregoing argument is clearly of a somewhat restricted scope. Our friend
s clearly subscribes to certain presuppositions are not shared by everyone.

432

George N. Schlesinger

Relevant to our argument among these is his belief that in the context of the
commonly known evidence rationality should place a person in a position that
is precisely midway between theism and its definite denial and that Divine
perfection presupposes equal and readily available access to evidence in support
of religious belief. Clearly our argument does not work for an individual who
is not willing to make these assumptions. In addition to that, and more importantly, some might conclude that even given all of s's assumptions the conclusion
I have reached is of little interest. After all what I could claim is no more than
the seemingly weak assertion that a person with s's attitude is obliged to be
slightly more inclined toward an acceptance of g than its complete rejection.
Does anything much follow from this?
It is crucial to realize, however, not only in the present context, but indeed
in the context of great many other theistic arguments as well, that one may
reasonably contend that the conclusion I have reached is by no means weak.
It is a basic principle of epistemology that in general a person is not justified
in positively embracing p or affirming the truth of p unless the likelihood of p
can reasonably be claimed to be very high. While it may not be obvious how
much support is required for p before a rational person is permitted or required
to subscribe to p, one would hardly claim that in the context of such weak
evidence makes the probability that p only slightly more than half, p is acceptable.
Thus, in general there are three possibilities-first when the probability of p is
higher than n (where n is according to most people closer to 1 than to 1/2 ), in
which case reason requires the acceptance of p. Second, when the probability
that p is false is more than n which is a situation that demands the acceptance
of not-po Third, the remaining cases in which one is to stay neutral with respect
to a commitment either to p or to not-po Staying neutral means withholding
judgments and implies not merely that one neither asserts p nor not-p, but that
one refrains from all actions the success of which presuppose the truth of p or
the falsity of p. This means that one should avoid situations in which one must
act either on assuming p or on assuming not-po
Such an attitude of neutrality is possible with respect to a large set of propositions. For example, in the case of 'Fred is a suitable candidate for the chairmanship of the board of directors' if I positively embrace it then it may be reasonable
that I should vote for Fred. On the other hand, if I have sufficient reason to
believe that the proposition is false, I ought to vote against him. Otherwise I
should withhold judgment, which in this case amounts to refraining from any
vote. Or if 'p' = 'i is a reasonably priced useful product,' then positive acceptance
implies that whenever I should be in the need of that kind of product I should
not refrain from buying it, while the rejection of p may imply among other
things, that upon being requested to sign a petition to ban i from the market I
should not feel obliged to refuse. A position of neutrality in this case should
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imply my abstaining from all such positive and negative acts with respect to i.
It may in general be claimed that toward any p that is a down-to-earth empirical

statement concerning a limited segment of reality the three attitudes mentioned
are possible, but not toward very basic propositions, propositions that are all
embracing, affecting every aspect of existence. I have claimed elsewhere for
instance that with respect to the claim concerning the validity of induction it is
impossible to remain completely neutral. It is impossible to withhold judgment
about all empirical statements and refrain from relevant acts accordingly since
it is impossible for an inhabitant of the universe to abstain from all actions
presupposing an empirical hypothesis, e.g. avoid standing here because of the
uncertain security ofthis place, and at the same time also avoid standing anywhere
else too.
Similarly, g is very different from the two propositions considered earlier.
The basic epistemological principle I have mentioned does not apply to g. If g
is true then a vast number of special activities must occupy the central part of
every person's life. One either engages in these activities as demanded by g or
one fails to do so and thereby positively violates the implications of g. There
just is no middle way in which one neither positively practice what is demanded
by g nor positively violates it. The epistemic principle which recognises three
possible attitudes toward a given proposition cannot apply in the context of a
proposition like g. Thus given that there exists no way of action which would
reflect a truly neutral position the theist may therefore reasonably claim that here
the rule must be that positive acceptance is rationally required either of g or -g
as soon as there is any evidence or argument pointing more in one direction than
the other.

v
Further brief reflection upon T's argument, which led to the formulation of
(8) should reveal a basic objection that may be levelled against most attempted
theistic proofs. This is an objection one comes across from time to time, yet for
some reason a fully articulated statement of it is hard to find anywhere in the
literature. Remarkably enough, the objection is such that it is not even necessary
to examine in full detail a given proof in order to raise the objection against it.
Furthermore, strange as it may sound initially, the more ingenious and the more
convincing the proof the stronger the objection seems to apply.
As we saw, T is committed to the commonsense view that it would be incompatible with Divine justice if any individual suffered a loss due to his failure to
conduct himself religiously, in case his lack of faith was not entirely a result of
his freely willed choice but due to accidental, external circumstances. This
implies that all human beings are entitled to be given the same opportunities and
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that access to convincing evidence for theism should be equally available to all,
and not vary with an individual's accidental circumstances. Suppose I am a
non-believer who has hitherto resisted all the theistic arguments that I could lay
my hands on; however, there exists a particular superior theistic proof which I
could grasp and which I would find entirely convincing, but it just so happens
that I shall never have the opportunity to learn about it. Is it fair that I should
lose everything that according to a theologian really matters simply because of
such unfortunate circumstances that are not my doing? Furthermore, should any
of the truly convincing proofs be particularly ingenious and complex-like some
contemporary versions of the ontological proof that require a good mastery of
modal logic-then it requires a high degree of intelligence to understand it. It
is very hard to reconcile with an elementary sense of fairness-no less than s
found it hard to accept the fact that anyone is to suffer the consequences of his
non-belief-that those capable of mastering elaborate logical arguments stand a
much better chance of attaining spiritual salvation than their less fortunately
endowed fellow beings. In addition, of course, concerning any novel proof that
may have been lately constructed we may well wonder about all the previous
generations who were not lucky enough to survive and have the chance to be
informed of such proofs which could have saved them?
In the light of these objections T may point out that his argument has the
unique advantage of not being involved in any such difficulties. It is central to
T's argument that the real evidence for theism be constantly present in front of
our eyes and that it speak clearly so that every individual is capable of understanding it irrespective of his innate logical talents or the amount of training he
has had or the knowledge he happens to possess. All that T's argument sets out
to demonstrate is how an individual who has willfully suppressed his belief that
g, maintaining that the universe contains no firm evidence in favor or against
it, can be made aware of the error of his position. But then to a person who in
fact has certain beliefs in his subconscious mind and is genuinely desirous to
bring those to the surface of his conscious awareness, indefinitely many ways
are available to achieve this end. Different psychologists will recommend different
approaches depending on the patients personal history, temperament and predilections. T's argument is of special interest only because it provides a general,
logical method of changing a person's beliefs which does not require a personal
acquaintance with that person and is entirely independent of his individual data
and the circumstances of his life.
It should seem therefore possible for T to maintain that his proofs cannot be
a source of unfair discrimination with respect to the success in obtaining religious
enlightment. The reason is that three kinds of individuals are possible: those for
whom any sort of proof like T's is superfluous; those for whom his proof may
be of help but then for those people many other means at least as effective are
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available as well and finally those who will find it entirely useless. The first
category consists of well disposed people who require no help from any
philosopher or theologian since they can clearly hear "the heaven speak of His
glory and the firmament His handiwork." The second category contains individuals who are anxious not to see God's existence proven to them but who are
open-minded enough to entertain the thought that they may be victims of selfdeception and are prepared to make genuine efforts to discover whether or not
they have any suppressed beliefs. Members of this category resemble those of
the first category in that T's proof is dispensible to them since these people do
not need T's proof in particular as there are any number of therapeutic methods
whereby a person becomes aware of suppressed thoughts, many of which may
be self-administered and require no more than an honest, thorough-going interpretation. The third category consists of really resolute non-believers who are not
willing genuinely to contemplate the possibility of self-deception. These people
will not subject themselves to a painstaking self-scrutiny and therefore T's argument will be of no help to them either. Presented with (a) and (8), and hence
with the disjunction that either ~ g or ~ Ws they will insist on being in a
position of knowing for sure that they have no suppressed beliefs and that they
have constantly kept their eyes wide open for possible evidence and have dispassionately examined all arguments they have heard.
It should be added that T's proof need not be looked upon as the one and only
proof in existence that escapes the objection based on Divine fairness. Advocates
of the Argument from Design for instance might make a good case for saying
that even some of the most recent and highly sophisticated versions of their proof
creates no problems as to how God could have permitted that an argument beyond
the reach of so many should see the light of day. They may well contend that
even in its most elaborate form the argument is ultimately no more than a
rigorous, detailed articulation of reasoning available to the most primitive mind.
It requires no sophistication at all, defenders of the argument would contend, to
see that the wondrous phenomena surrounding us cannot but be the design of a
Supreme being. It is only that the more sophisticated a person, the more he may
be capable of explaining the logical reasons for why those phenomena may be
legitimately taken as confirming Divine design.
I am not sure, however, that a more radical reply to the objection from Divine
fairness may not be available, a reply which will permit the construction of any
sort of theistic proof at any time. The reply would be based on the shared
presupposition that elementary fairness demands that everyone should be given
the same chance to obtain religious salvation and that in particular the amount
of good will required in order to see the truth of theism should not vary from
individual to individual. At the same time one need not agree that this implies
that every evidence and proof must therefore be equally available to everyone.
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We must remember that different people have been created with different temperaments and what rationally appeals to one person does not necessarily do so
to another. Some people are greatly impressed by arguments based on concrete
tangible and visible evidence even if the argument is not one hundred percent
rigorous; others have a special predilection for abstract reasoning. Also the
amount of persuasion required very much depends on the general climate of
opinion in which an individual may find himself. In a generation in which certain
presuppositions made by all in earlier times are no longer taken for granted, a
proof may be required for that for which in the past no one required a proof.
To put it briefly therefore: the different availability of proofs for theism need
not be interpreted as signs of discrimination, since it may be necessary to compensate for the initial differences that may exist in the mental and emotional
facilities of different individuals and in the conditioning he has inevitably undergone in the society of which he is a member.
CONCLUSION

We have seen that a sufficiently open-minded person in the sense of one
prepared to admit that one can have no guarantee that one does not have certain
suppressed beliefs too repugnant to him to hold consciously, may be shown that
the assumption that complete fairness is a necessary property of a perfect Divine
being gives rise to an argument that should make him lean toward theism.
We have also seen that the traditional, Anselmian theistic proposition is unique
among the infinitely many propositions that postulates a supernatural creator and
supervisor of human affairs and that by virtue of its very meaning rationality
demands that one's tendency to embrace that particular proposition i.e. to embrace
g, should be greater than the tendency to embrace a belief in any other kind of
deity.
Finally, we have had a brief discussion of an argument as to why the theist
himself may have good reasons, based on the assumption of complete Divine
fairness, to try to invalidate most of the alleged proofs for the existence. Strange
as it may sound at first, according to this argument, the more persuasive and
the more decisive the proof is claimed to be, the more reason for the theist to
want to find fault with it. However, we have seen that the argument can be
resisted.'
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NOTE
1. I am indebted to Professor T. V. Morris for the enlightening discussions we have had on the
subject of this paper.

